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Local networks often consist of a cable snaking through a 
building with sockets in each room into which users can plug 
their personal computers. Using such a network for building a 
coherent distributed or network operating system is difficult 
because the system administrators have no control over the 
users' machines - not the applications programs, not the sys- 
tem kernel, not even the choice of hardware. In this paper we 
discuss a general method to protect such systems against mali- 
cious users without placing any restrictions on the kinds of 
operating systems that can be constructed. Depending on the 
details of the hardware, either one-way functions or public key 
cryptography forms the basis for the protection. As an example 
of our method, we show how a traditional object-oriented 
capability system can be implemented on top of the basic 
protection mechanism, and how a service for accounting and 
resource control can be constructed. 
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1. Introduction 
Local networks often consist of a cable snaking 
through a building with sockets in each room into 
which users can plug their personal computers, 
intelligent erminals, file servers, tape drivers, etc. 
Some of these machines may provide services for 
others, whereas others may simply be "consumers" 
rather than "producers" of service. Building a 
coherent, secure operating system in an environ- 
ment in which the system administrators have no 
way to prevent malicious users from plugging un- 
controllable personal spies into the network pre- 
sents great difficulties. In this paper we discuss a 
general method for constructing secure operating 
systems under these circumstances without putting 
any undue restrictions on the kind of systems that 
can be built. We do not attempt in this paper to 
provide protection against forms of attack other 
than through the regular network interfaces. Other 
methods of protection, such as end-to-end encryp- 
tion, are necessary to ward off passive or active 
wire tappers. This paper discusses a method 
whereby any person can plug any computer into 
the network, even if it is running a completely 
untrustworthy (or malicious) operating system, so 
it can use the resources offered by the system and 
offer services to the system, yet not harm the 
system's ecurity. 
We explicitly assume that a malicious user has 
complete control over his own machine, including 
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its operating system. Consequently, we reject any 
solution to the problem that requires users to only 
run machines that have user/kernel mode hard- 
ware, with an "officially approved" operating sys- 
tem running in kernel mode. It is too easy for 
anyone to just plug an arbitrary machine into the 
socket. However, we will consider solutions that 
require special (but very simple) hardware facili- 
ties on the host's interface chip, or in the interface 
card between the network cable and the users' 
machines, because the interfaces can be physically 
locked up in the cable duct within the wall, if need 
be, to prevent tampering. Finally, we will also 
consider solution not requiring any special hard- 
ware at all. 
The key problem in a network of anonymous 
machines is authentication. Any user should be 
able to offer a service in such a way that no other 
(malicious) user can impersonate it. In effect, if 
three machines claim to be Johnson's New Im- 
proved File Server, how can a user machine tell 
which is the real one and which are imposters? 
Identifying services by having a directory server 
that maps service names onto physical socket 
numbers is not always feasible, for example, be- 
cause some services may move around or be 
accessed via another network or via dial-up tele- 
phone lines. 
In our proposal, authentication does not rely on 
any "physical socket numbers", nor does it intro- 
duce any vulnerable and undesirable centralised 
"authentication server". Instead, access to services 
is controlled by knowledge (or lack thereof) of 
certain critical information. The mechanism 
described below is incorporated in the Amoeba 
distributed operating system [13] being developed 
at the Vrije Universiteit. 
2. Services, Ports, Signatures, and Capabilities 
The basic paradigm of the proposed istributed 
system is the service. Every object within a certain 
service can only be accessed through one of the 
servers, the processes that constitute the service. 
Each server accepts requests in the form of mes- 
sages from a port on a client process to a port on 
the server process. The server then sends a reply 
from its port to the client port. A service is analo- 
gous to an abstract data type in that the only way 
the client can manipulate the objects is via the set 
of allowed messages; he has no way of getting at 
the representation directly. 
Every port has two names, one for clients to 
send to it, and one for servers to read from it: the 
put-port, and the get-port. The relation between 
them will be described later. Port names are (long) 
bit strings, chosen randomly from a sparse address 
space, so that without knowledge of its number, a 
client cannot send messages to a port; nor is it 
possible to "make up" port numbers and come up 
with a legal (existing) port number with any rea- 
sonable chance of success. 
In the real world, signatures are used to uniquely 
identify who signed what. A signature must there- 
fore have the following properties: only the 
"owner" of the signature must be able to sign 
documents with his signature, and others must be 
able to verify that the signature is genuine, and 
that it belong to its purported owner. We shall 
show (in Section 5) that our ports can also be used 
as signatures. As with ports, there are also pairs of 
signatures, public signatures and private sig- 
natures. The private signature is needed to sign a 
message, and the public signature can be used to 
check if it is genuine. 
A capability in our proposed protection scheme 
is a bit string that gives the bearer permission to 
use some services, or more specifically, to perform 
some set of operations on some object (e.g. a file) 
managed by a certain server. Such a capability 
consists generally of four parts, as shown in Fig. 1. 
The Server field of a capability is the put-port for 
the service, the Object field, serves as an index in a 
table of objects, maintained by the server, and 
serves to identify the object, the Rights field indi- 
cates which operations may be requested with this 
capability, and the Random field makes the capa- 
bility sparse. We refer to Section 7 for a further 
discussion of capabilities. 
In a centralised system with a protected oper- 
ating system kernel, capabilities can be kept in the 
kernel; in a distributed system of the kind dis- 
cussed earlier, the kernels in the user machines 
cannot be trusted, so another protection mecha- 
nism is needed. We have chosen to use the sparse- 
ness of the port space and capability space as our 
protection mechanism. The port name space has 
been made sparse, and port names are chosen 
randomly, so that without knowledge of a port 
name a process cannot access the service behind 
that port. 
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Fig. 1. Lay out of a typical capability. 
RANDOM 
Given the name of a service (an ASCII string, 
say) directory servers can be used to look up the 
ports for that service, just like a telephone direc- 
tory is used to find a person's phone number. The 
directory service can have a tree structure, so that 
every user can have a private directory to keep 
capabilities. If a user does not divulge the capabil- 
ity for his private directory, he can keep every- 
thing in it secret. For added protection, clients can 
encrypt ports before trusting them to the directory 
service. Note that directory service need not be a 
service offered by "The System". The directory 
service does not need any privileges, nor need it be 
special in any sense. 
Upon login, a login server can authenticate a 
user (check the password), and subsequently give 
the capability of the home directory to the com- 
mand interpreter. From this directory a user can 
easily obtain the necessary capabilities. 
Public services can use a well-known public 
directory to store the ports that give access to 
them. A private service can make itself known to 
selected clients by putting its put-port in their 
directories (using a public write-only capability). 
3. The User Interface 
The International Standards Organisation (ISO) 
has proposed a model for the communication be- 
tween computers. This Open Systems Interconnec- 
tion model (OSI) [1] consists of seven layers of 
protocol, each layer performing a well-defined 
function. 
Most high-speed local networks are broadcast 
networks; that is, each packet passes every host 
and is taken off the broadcast medium by the 
intended recipient. The network layer, which is 
responsible for routing and congestion control is 
therefore often not present in these local area 
networks. 
Our proposal - to use capabilities (ports) as 
addresses - can be viewed as a proposal for another 
kind of network layer. Our new network layer is 
responsible, by matching up get-ports and put- 
ports, for getting messages to their destination. We 
intend to show that this network layer can be 
made secure under two different assumptions. 
First, we shall assume that the network layer func- 
tions reside in a small hardware interface which is 
inserted between the host and the network in such 
a way that the interface cannot be tampered with. 
Later,we shall drop this assumption and show that 
a solution is still possible using public key encryp- 
tion. 
The message passing mechanism is imple- 
mented by the port layer, which, in turn, uses 
lower protocol ayers (data link layer and physical 
layer as in the ISO OSI proposal). The port layer 
may be implemented as a set of system calls, or as 
a set of subroutines in user space, possibly in 
read-only memory. User programs can directly 
interface to the port layer, or via a set of library 
routines, implementing higher layers of the OSI 
protocols, or simulating an operating system en- 
vironment. The interface is simple, two calls suffice 
for sending and receiving messages, and these calls 
are the same for clients and servers: 
put (var putport, srcport, signature: PORT; 
var buffer: MESSAGE); 
get (var getport, srcport, signature: PORT; 
var buffer: MESSAGE); 
The first three parameters are a local, and a re- 
mote port, and a signature. The last parameter is
either a buffer of data to be sent, or a buffer to put 
received ata in. There is another call for servers, 
for the creation of ports: 
makeport (var getport, putport: PORT); 
On top of this layer, a library layer can be built 
with little effort, which combines the ports in 
requests and replies with the object, rights, and 
random fields of Fig. 1 to form capabilities for 
objects. To a client, interfacing to this set of 
library routines, sending requests to a server is no 
different conceptually, from sending requests di- 
rectly to the associated object. 
4. Protection Using One-Way Functions 
In this section we shall discuss protection in 
networks in which a (small) hardware interface has 
been inserted between the user machines and the 
cable; in the following one we will extend the idea 
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to networks lacking such interfaces. Figure 2 gives 
an example of the kind of system we are referring 
to here. Between each user machine and the shared 
cable is a simple hardware device, the interface, to 
be described below. In many local networks, each 
user machine has a logic board inserted into its 
backplane to provide contention control and other 
functions. Our interface could easily be included 
on such a board. Alternatively, it could be inside 
the wall, between the socket and the cable, as 
mentioned earlier. In any case, we assume the 
interface is tamperproof. Furthermore, we assume 
that each interface can monitor all the traffic on 
the cable, selecting out messages intended for it. 
The protection scheme nvisioned here is based 
on one-way ciphers [4,9,14]. The designers of the 
interface logic must choose a function, F, such 
that given F(x) it is very difficult to deduce x. 
The function must be carefully chosen, because the 
function itself will be publicly known, thus en- 
abling potential intruders to experiment with it at 
great length. 
To achieve the necessary protection, the get-port 
and put-port associated with each service will be 
related by the formula: 
put-port = F( get-port ). 
When a process wants to create a new service, it 
calls makeport, which picks a number chosen ran- 
domly from a large (i.e. sparse) address pace, and 
uses it as the get-port. It then computes the put-port 
using the one-way function. The put-port can be 
safely given to (selected) clients to use for sending 
messages to the server. 
To receive messages, the server does a get on 
the get-port. In effect, it passes the get-port o the 
interface, which immediately applies F to it to 
compute the corresponding put-port. This put-port 
is then stored in a little table inside the interface. 
As each message passes by on the cable, the inter- 
face compares the destination port contained in it 
to the put-ports stored in its internal table. If a 
match is found, the message is copied to the 
interface and then passed to the user machine. 
To see that this system works, note that the 
only way for the intruder in Fig. 2 to receive a 
message intended for the server is to do a get on 
the server's get-port, a number that the server 
keeps secret, and which cannot be derived from 
the publicly known put-port. Furthermore, due to 
the sparseness of the port space, picking get-ports 
CABLE 
CLIENT INTRUDER SERVER 
HOSTS 
Fig. 2. The network model, using a network interface. 
at random and hoping to catch an occasional 
message is unlikely to be productive, especially if 
the interface only has space to store a limited 
number of ports to scan for. The port to be used 
by the server to reply to the client can be safely 
included in the client-to-server message, because 
the intruder has no way of obtaining this message. 
As an aside, it is noteworthy that servers can 
migrate around the network easily in this system, 
since messages are directed to logical ports, not 
physical machine or socket numbers. 
The one-way function mechanism is also used 
to send signed messages. When a put is done, the 
message passes through one of the interfaces, which 
applies F to the srcport and the signature fields of 
the message. A process can thus select a private 
signature (e.g. by a call to makeport). The public 
signature, the encrypted form of the private sig- 
nature, can be given to other processes which can 
use it to check the identity of the sender of mes- 
sages. The process in possession of the secret 
private signature is the only process capable of 
sending messages with the encrypted public sig- 
nature. Note that signatures are just ports, al- 
though they are not necessarily used as such. 
Not only is the signature field encrypted on 
transmitted messages, but the srcport field also. 
This puts no undue restriction on communicating 
processes, because they need the get-port version 
of the srcport anyway in order to receive replies, 
and it prevents equences of messages such as the 
following: process X sends a message to server A, 
with server B's  put-port as the srcport (both ports 
are public and the srcport is not encrypted); server 
A may or may not make sense of the message, but 
in any case it will send a reply to B, because A 
assumes B is the sender; B will receive the mes- 
sage, assume it is a (probably illegal) request and 
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Fig. 3. A message, containing a dest inat ion port b', a source port, a, and a signature port s, as it passes from host A to host B. 
Get-ports are indicated by a, b and s, put-ports by a' ,  b' and s'. 
react by sending a reply back to A, which, in turn, 
treats it as a request, and so on. Encryption of the 
srcport prevents uch and other pranks. 
The whole process of sending messages is il- 
lustrated in Fig. 3, where we see a process on host 
A transmitting a message to a process on host B. 
We assume that B does a get on port b, and A 
does a put on port b', where b' = F(b). B's get is 
passed to the interface, which applies F to b, and 
waits until an appropriate message comes by. A 
uses srcport a, and signature s in its put call. The 
message from A, after it passes through the inter- 
face into the communication subnet, contains b', 
a', s', and, when it is delivered to B after having 
passed B's interface, it contains b, a', and s'. 
Our basic idea is also applicable to networks 
other than that of Fig. 2. As an example, consider 
a network in which the routing is done using 
physical machine numbers rather than the port 
matching with associative memory system just de- 
scribed. When a put is done, the interface broad- 
casts a "locate" message to all the other interfaces, 
asking "Do  you know where this put-port is 
located?" After the replies have come back, the 
sending interface knows which physical address to 
use. For efficiency, the interface could maintain a 
cache of recently used ports and their locations, to 
avoid repeated lookups. An elegant solution to the 
problem of locating ports in store-and-forward 
networks is described in [7]. 
Another kind of network to which the one-way 
function idea is easily adapted is a star-shaped 
network, where each socket has a dedicated wire to 
a central switching machine, for example, the com- 
pany PABX (Private Automatic Branch Exchange), 
which many office buildings use both for their 
in-house telephone system and for data. In this 
configuration, the functions previously performed 
in the interfaces are now performed by the switch, 
and the tables of put-ports are also located there. 
In this case we must assume that each host has a 
private and secure communication channel to the 
switch, and that the switch itself can be completely 
trusted. Similarly, in a store-and-forward packet 
switching network, the packet switches can process 
the puts and gets and locate ports by exchanging 
information among themselves, as described above. 
Finally, if all the machines in a network do 
have protected operating system kernels, the inter- 
face function can be located in the kernel. The get 
and put commands then become system calls. If 
port locations is needed, the kernels can exchange 
suitable messages. 
It is crucial for the one-way cipher protection 
mechanism that the interfaces cannot be cir- 
cumvented. If an intruder can get around the 
interface he can receive all the messages that pass 
through the network, and generate messages pur- 
porting to be sent by any service. Ideally the 
interface is built into the network interface chip. 
The only way to tamper with it then, is not to use 
it and to build one's own interface. In many 
environments (office, university) this is not likely 
to happen because of the cost and effort involved. 
In a building where the interfaces are locked up in 
the cable duct in the wall our protection method is 
reduced to physically protecting the interfaces. 
Intruders communicating through an interface 
cannot circumvent he protection mechanism un- 
less they succeed in stealing secret ports. 
5. Protection Using Public-Key Cryptography 
Now we will present he most general solution 
to the protection problem, one that requires neither 
a protected kernel nor any special interface hard- 
ware. 
In an insecure network environment encryption 
of messages and ports is needed to send informa- 
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tion securely. We assume intruders can listen to 
other process' messages passing by, and even mod- 
ify, intercept or replay messages. All this may 
affect the performance of the network, but it must 
not affect the security. 
The method we shall describe here enables 
processes to communicate securely. It uses a pub- 
lic key cryptosystem [2] for the transmission of 
messages between client and server. Every service 
uses a key pair, the public key to be used for the 
encryption of messages to it, and the private key 
for decryption. The makeport primitive in the port 
layer is used to create port pairs, each port consist- 
ing of a port-identifier (which is used solely for 
identification of the port, and need not be kept 
secret), and an encryption key (put-port) or a 
decryption key (get-port). Messages to the server 
are encrypted and decrypted with these keys, and 
headed by the port-id in plaintext, so a process 
can find out which key to use. 
The port-id need only be large enough that no 
two servers accidentally choose the same port 
name; however, even if they do, no harm is done - 
only the "real" server can decrypt messages ad- 
dressed to it. 
It is not necessary to encrypt the entire mes- 
sage, nor is it necessary to encrypt every message 
using public key encryption. If the information 
travelling between client and server is not secret, it 
is sufficient o encrypt only the header (including 
the reply port), and - to prevent intruders from 
modifying the plaintext contents - a checksum of 
the complete message. This checksum is also 
needed when whole messages are encrypted, be- 
cause it guards against modification. The check- 
sum algorithm must be carefully chosen, or it will 
be possible to generate modifications of a message 
that yield the same checksum. Protection against 
replay can be obtained by using sequence numbers 
in the traffic between client and server, a necessity 
in an unreliable network anyway. Public key en- 
cryption is still computationally expensive. There 
may be public key hardware that can encrypt and 
decrypt at network speeds in the future, but while 
fast public key is not available, it can be used to 
set up a secure channel using conventional 
cryptography. 
Requests from client to server are encrypted, 
using the key in the put-port for the services. The 
replies from the server to the client are encrypted 
in exactly the same way, using the client's put-port, 
thus preventing other processes from decrypting 
replies, even if they have the put-port for the 
service. 
6. Object-Oriented Protection 
Using our protection mechanism as a basis, it is 
easy to build a traditional object-oriented capabil- 
ity-based protection system on top of it. Whenever 
a client asks a server to create a new object, the 
server eturns the object's capability (see Fig. 1) in 
the return message. The Seroer field is the put-port 
used to send messages to the server managing the 
object. The Object field is just an index into the 
server's tables, to allow it to locate the object 
quickly. The Rights field, which may or may not 
be needed, is a bit map telling which operations 
are allowed on the object. The Random field pro- 
vides the protection. 
Before looking at the general case, consider an 
interesting special case - no Rights field, that is, 
the possessor of a capability can always perform 
all operations. To perform any operation, the cli- 
ent sends a message to the server's put-port, with 
the capability and the desired operation specified 
in the message. The server uses the Object field to 
index into its tables to find the entry for the object 
in question. If the random number stored there 
matches the one in the capability, the operation is 
allowed, otherwise it is not. 
To provide for capabilities with partial rights, a 
slight variation is used. When the object is created, 
a random number is chosen and stored in the 
server's object table. A capability with the correct 
rights and a known constant (e.g. 0) in the Ran- 
dom field is then constructed. Finally, the Rights 
and Random fields are treated as a unit and 
encrypted, using the newly chosen random number 
as key. The resulting capability is sent back to the 
client. 
Later, when the client tries to use the capability, 
the server uses the Object field to find the key and 
decrypt the Rights and Random fields. If the 
known constant appears in the plaintext Random 
field, the capability is apparently genuine, and the 
Rights bits can be believed. For this method to 
work, the encryption function must mix the two 
fields thoroughly, so changing any bit in either one 
will cause the decryption to fail. 
This system has some properties lightly differ- 
ent from conventional capability systems. To start 
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with, it is perfectly safe to allow users to manipu- 
late capabilities directly within their own address 
spaces, because any attempts to tamper with the 
bits will easily be detected. Second, clients can give 
duplicates of their capabilities away at will. How- 
ever, clients can also give away subsets of their 
rights by simply asking the server to generate a 
new capability with a subset of the Rights bits on. 
(This operation could itself be protected by a 
Rights bit.) 
But the most striking difference from conven- 
tional capability systems is the ease with which an 
authorised client can "take back" all existing ca- 
pabilities, without the need for indirect objects, 
back pointers and other complicated machinery 
(see e.g. [5]). All the client need do is ask the server 
to change the random number in the server's ob- 
ject table and return a capability encrypted with 
the new random number. This operation, which 
would normally be protected by a bit in the Rights 
field, instantly invalidates all outstanding capabili- 
ties to the object. 
When this method of manipulating the Rights 
bits is used, a client who wants to pass a capability 
with a reduced set of rights to another process 
must ask the server to generate the new capability 
for him. We have discovered an alternative scheme 
that does not incur this overhead. It works as 
follows. Suppose a capability has n rights, num- 
bered 1 to n. Choose n one-way functions, 
G 1 . . . .  , G, that are commutative, that is, 
G,G/( R ) = G/Gi( R ) for all functions G, and Gj. 
Let R be the Random field of a capability gener- 
ated by a server as before. The initial capability 
has all the rights on. 
To create a new capability with right k off, 
replace R by Gk(R ). This new capability can be 
further restricted by applying another G, and so 
on. Since the G's commute, the order in which the 
functions are applied is irrelevant. When the capa- 
bility has been sufficiently restricted, the Rights 
field is loaded with the unencrypted bit mask. 
When the capability is presented to the server, 
the server applies the G's indicated by the Rights 
field to the random number stored in the object. If 
the result agrees with the Random field in the 
capability, the capability is valid and the Rights 
field is genuine. Note that the presence of the 
mask in the Rights field is merely for efficiency; in 
theory, the server could try all 2" combinations of 
the functions to see if any matched. If a client 
modifies the Rights field, the server will simply 
reject the capability as invalid. 
7. Comparison with Other Protection Schemes 
We have now shown how protection can be 
achieved in a distributed or network operating 
system using one-way functions or, if need be, 
public-key cryptography. We have also demon- 
strated how this mechanism can be used as basis 
for building a distributed capability-based operat- 
ing system. In this section we compare our ap- 
proach to protection in computer networks to other 
proposals. 
Among the ideas that have been suggested are 
centralised authentication servers, passwords, 
access control lists, and public-key cryptography. 
Although a centralised authentication server [8] 
has some merit, we feel that it is not desirable to 
introduce a powerful, centralised, and therefore 
vulnerable component, into a distributed system if 
it can possibly be avoided. Our interface scheme 
shows how this goal can be achieved without any 
centralised components at all. 
Another approach frequently suggested for net- 
works of highly autonomous, multiprogrammed 
mainframes or large minicomputers is to have each 
remote request accompanied by the password of 
the requesting user [11]. In effect, the user logs 
onto the remote machine, and thereafter is treated 
as a local user. In a controlled environment, in 
which all machines on the network are assumed to 
be completely trustworthy, this method may work, 
but in the case we have been considering - any- 
body can plug an arbitrary machine into the net- 
work at will - sending passwords in plaintext 
obviously will not work. Encrypting them helps, 
but introduces a host of problems involving key 
distribution and authentication. 
Donnelley and Fletcher [3] suggest using access 
control lists as a protection mechanism. To do so, 
however, assumes that a foolproof way exists to 
authenticate users. They assume that the network 
takes care of this somehow, perhaps by perma- 
nently associating each physical socket number on 
the network with a specific user. If this assumption 
is valid, their method works, but if the whole 
building is wired and people can carry portable 
computers from office to office at will, as we have 
assumed, another method is needed. 
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Donnelley and Fletcher have also proposed a 
protection mechanism using public-key cryptogra- 
phy [3]. In this proposal, a server encrypts capabil- 
ities sent to clients using its own private key. Since 
only it knows the private key, intruders cannot 
forge valid capabilities. Capabilities are distrib- 
uted to clients by encrypting them with the clients' 
public keys. 
DonneUey and Fletcher are concerned about 
the possibility of intruders illicitly obtaining data 
from inside clients' memories. For this reason they 
ensure that capabilities are always encrypted with 
the client's public key, even inside the client's own 
memory. Even if one believes that such measures 
are necessary (which we do not), there remains the 
danger that an intruder clever neough to acquire 
an encrypted capability from inside a process' 
address pace will also be clever enough to acquire 
the decryption key, which must be stored some- 
where nearby, because it is needed every time a 
capability is used. For some reason, they assume 
servers are immune to theft, since inside them 
capabilities are stored in plaintext. 
The problem of capability theft aside, this 
method has several other drawbacks. To start with, 
public-key encryption is more expensive than a 
one-way function, which is why we use encryption 
only if the interface method (in hardware of soft- 
ware) is not applicable. Another advantage of the 
interface method is that, when implemented in 
hardware, at least, it integrates addressing and 
protection in a simple way by allowing messages 
to be sent to ports rather than to machines. Our 
capability scheme also provides mechanisms for 
associating individual access rights with capabili- 
ties, as well as a way to retract outstanding capa- 
bilities. 
Another point is that one-way functions are 
easier to find than cryptographic systems, because 
the former are a superset of the latter. This prop- 
erty is inherent, because one-way functions do not 
require the existence of an inverse function, 
whereas encryption functions do. With a larger 
"space" to choose functions from, it should be 
simpler to find a suitable one-way function than a 
suitable cryptographic transformation. 
Finally, our method is more robust than that of 
Donnelley and Fletcher. In theirs, if a server's 
secret key is ever compromished, it must be 
changed immediately, thus invalidating all existing 
capabilities to objects managed by that server. It is 
not clear how one can recover from this situation. 
The server cannot just issue a new capability to 
anyone presenting an old one, because it cannot 
distinguish genuine ones from those generated with 
the compromised key. In contrast, if the get-port 
of one of our servers is compromised, it too must 
choose a new one (and publish the new put-port), 
but the objects it controls are still protected by 
their individual random numbers. The only poten- 
tial harm is that prior to the discovery of the 
compromise, an intruder may have improperly in- 
tercepted and processed some requests from cli- 
ents. Fortunately, even with his knowledge of the 
server's get-port, the intruder cannot access exist- 
ing objects. In the event that the random number 
in an object is inadvertently disclosed, only that 
one object is comprmised, thus greatly limiting the 
potential dmage. 
8. Efficiency Considerations 
Building a network interface as we have de- 
scribed is straightforward. Each interface needs a 
processor (or hardwired logic) to compute the 
one-way function. In addition it needs a table to 
store the put-ports corresponding to the gets that 
have been issued locally. If a put-port occupies, 
say, 6 bytes, 1000 of the, for example, will require 
6K of memory. To allow both rapid lookup and 
deletion of a port after a successful get, the put- 
port should be hashed into a, say, 10-bit number 
giving the index into a 1K hash table. A table 
entry has 6 bytes for the port and 2 bytes for a 
pointer to an overflow chain in a second table. The 
main table has 8K bytes, and the overflow table 
needs another 8K bytes in the worst case (all ports 
hash to the same 10-bit number). This amount of 
memory (16K bytes) costs less than $100, and the 
price is falling rapidly. 
When the start of a message is detected on the 
cable, the interface should start reading it into an 
internal buffer. As soon as the header is available, 
the hash code of the message's destination port 
can be computed. While the data part of the 
message is pouring in, the interface can look up 
the hash code in the port table. If a hit is found, 
the message is kept and passed on to the com- 
puter, otherwise it is just ignored. 
The efficiency of one-way ciphers as the method 
to obtain secure communication between processes 
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far exceeds the efficiency of public-key encrypted 
messages. In contrast o public-key schemes, gen- 
erating keys (ports) in the one-way cipher method 
is cheap: the cost of generating a port-size random 
number. Any good random number generator will 
do. Computing a one-way cipher function on a 
64-bit get-port ypically takes 1 to 10 milliseconds, 
depending on the hardware, and the algorithm 
used. Encrypting the header and the checksum of 
a packet, say a 512-bit quantity, with existing 
public key algoritms will take from 100 millisec- 
onds up to perhaps 10 seconds. Additionally, pub- 
lic key encryption must be done twice per message, 
once to encrypt he message, and once to decrypt 
it again. When one-way ciphers can be used, the 
encryption eed only be done once per get op- 
eration; if the interface is clever and keeps a cache 
of recently encountered get-port/put-port combi- 
nations, it need not even be done that often. 
The size of a port, when one-way ciphers are 
used, would typically be between 48 and 128 bits. 
With a 48-bit port, and 1000 different services, 
only 1 in 101~ ports are used. Assuming a one-way 
ciphers is used with a degeneracy of less than 200 
[9], one try in 109 will yield a legal get-port for one 
of the put-ports. A brute force effort to crack the 
one-way cipher can take as few as 106 seconds, 
assuming an enciphering time of 1 msec. This is 
barely acceptable. If the degeneracy can be 
lowered, or more bits are used, the cracking time 
becomes much longer. This issue is discussed in 
[9]. 
The keys in existing public key cryptosystems 
must be large [6,10]. Rivest, Shamir and Adleman's 
algorithm, for example, needs keys of about 512 
bits to withstand prolonged attacks. In contrast o 
the one-way cipher scheme, and existing capability 
systems, these capabilities require considerable 
space as well as long encryption and decryption 
times. We must note, however, that any system 
without any protection from an operating system 
and with an insecure communication system, needs 
encryption to transmit messages securely anyway. 
Fast local networks can transmit packets at a 
rate of one every few milliseconds. A good protec- 
tion mechanism should work at the same rate, at 
least. The one-way cipher mechanism meets this 
requirement, especially if it becomes possible to ue 
"one-way cipher hardware" in the future. The 
public key scheme gets nowhere near this require- 
ment yet; at the moment fast public key al- 
gorithms do not yet exist. With current public key 
algorithms, software ncryption times of 100 msec 
to 10 sec per message should be expected. In the 
forseeable future we shall probably see reasonable 
fast "public key chips", but it is doubtful that 
public-key encryption will ever be as fast as apply- 
ing a one-way function, because the latter is inher- 
ently less stringent. 
9. Resource Control 
In this section a service is discussed that can be 
used for several forms of accounting and resource 
control. For each user and service, the Bank Server 
maintains Bank Accounts, containing amounts of 
Virtual Money (because of the resemblance to 
"real" money) in one or more currencies. Service is 
measured in Virtual Money: Disk blocks, cpu sec- 
onds, phototypesetter pages, and database queries 
are examples of services that can be offered by the 
system, in return for an amount of Virtual Money 
in one or more currencies. 
The Bank Service, as the manager of Virtual 
Money, handles requests from clients and servers 
to transfer amounts of Virtual Money from one 
account to another. Clients pay for services re- 
ndered by servers in Virtual Money, which is used 
to maintain resource quotas, to do accounting, to 
schedule resources among a group of users, etc. 
Before we go into the possible policies for resource 
control we shall look at the structure and mecha- 
nisms of the Bank Server. 
We must make some assumptions about who 
trusts whom in our system. Ideally, of course, one 
process need not trust any other process. Systems 
where this is the case, have been discussed in the 
literature [10,8], and require public-key encryption 
and storage of encrypted messages as proof of 
having been received. Although the methods pre- 
sented here are sound, we believe that they are not 
yet practical. Public-key encryption requires very 
large keys, it is slow, and requires igned messages 
to be retained, because they may later be required 
as proof of having received them. It is therefore 
hard to realise public-key encryption without a 
trusted file system [12]. 
We assume the Bank Server is trusted by its 
clients; that is, the Bank Server's clients believe the 
Bank Server will stick to the rules on accounting 
matters. As a trusted third party, the Bank Server 
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can mediate between a server process and a client 
process, and see to it that the client has sufficient 
funds to pay for requests to be carried out by the 
server. The Bank Server does not trust its clients. 
Clients must provide a capability along with re- 
quests to the Bank Server if they want to withdraw 
funds or examine their accounts. Signatures are 
used by client processes to identify themselves to 
other processes. 
Let us suppose a server and its client mutually 
distrust each other, but both trust the Bank Server. 
The server carries out requests in return for pay- 
ment by the client. The Bank Server must check if 
the client has sufficient funds to pay for the re- 
quest before it is carried out, and to pay after it 
has satisfactorily been carried out by the server. 
The problem lies in checking if a request has been 
carried out correctly. Generally, this means that 
the Bank Server must duplicate the work of the 
server. Another possibility seems to let clients check 
if the server's ervices are up to standard, but it is 
unlikely that clients will always honestly admit 
that requests were carried out correctly if payment 
can be avoided by lying about it. 
We have assumed that servers distrust their 
clients, but that clients must have some, but not 
much, trust in the servers they use, namely only to 
the extent that a server, after having been paid in 
advance, will carry out the next request correctly. 
The procedure for making a request could then be 
something like this: Preparing to make a request, 
the client deposits the amount required on one of 
the server's bank accounts. Then the request is 
sent to the server. The server checks the account o 
see if there are sufficient funds and carries out the 
request. The client can check if the request was 
carried out to its satisfaction before sending the 
next request. 
The structure of the Bank Server has been 
chosen to make this sequence of operations effi- 
cient. Usually servers will build up a reputation of 
being reliable and trustworthy, so that clients will 
deposit larger amounts on the server's accounts to 
pay for many requests at a time. Servers may 
implement caches of clients' credits so they do not 
have to enquire into the status of a client's account 
for every request hat is made. 
The Bank Server maintains accounts containing 
amounts of Virtual Money in different currencies. 
New currencies can be created ynamically. When 
a new resource is installed, for instance, a new 
currency could be created to represent the amount, 
or quota of the new resource that each user may 
consume. The Bank Server accepts requests to 
create a new currency from any process. (Since the 
Bank Server is a regular kind of service, it could of 
course be a policy that the creation of a new 
currency will cost a certain amount of Virtual 
Money in another currency). The Bank Server 
returns a mint-master capability for the new cur- 
rency, plus the new currency's name, a small in- 
teger. The holder of the mint-master capability 
specifies the amount of Virtual Money to be coined 
in the new currency, and to which account it 
should be deposited. He can take Virtual Money 
out of circulation, mint some more, remove a 
currency altogether, or even devalue or revalue a 
currency. 
The Bank Server also maintains private accounts. 
Each user may create one or more private accounts 
as follows. First, the user selects a private sig- 
nature, which produces a public signature, by 
applying F to it. When the user's processes end 
subsequent messages with the same signature, the 
receivers of these messages can use the public 
signature as proof they came from the same user. 
After choosing this signature, the user sends a 
request, signed with the signature, to the Bank 
Server to create a private account. The Bank Server 
then creates the account, which is made to contain 
amounts of Virtual Money in any currency, and 
returns a capability for it. Initially, the account is 
empty. The public signature can be used to iden- 
tify the account for purposes of depositing into it. 
The capability, or a capability with restricted rights, 
is necessary for other operations on the account, 
such as withdrawing from, examining, or closing 
down the account. 
Besides private accounts there are server 
accounts. Server accounts can be used by services 
to hold the amounts, paid in advance by the 
clients, for services till to be rendered. Each server 
(i.e. each process) may create server accounts, 
which, depending on the system's policy, may cost 
a certain amount in some currency or other. As 
private accounts, server accounts are also created 
by sending a signed request o the Bank Server. 
The public signature given to the Bank Server, can 
be used subsequently to identify the server account 
in order to make deposits. The Bank Server re- 
turns a capability for the server account to the 
creator. 
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Server accounts are somewhat more com- 
plicated than private accounts. Each server account 
consists of zero or more client subaccounts that, in 
turn, contain amounts in one or more currencies. 
A client subaccount is identified by the client's 
public signature. Client subaccounts within a server 
account are created and removed dynamically: 
created when an amount is first deposited in it, 
and removed when empty. A request, depositiong 
into a client subaccount must contain the public 
signatures of the server account and the client 
subaccount within it. All other operations must be 
done using the capability, or a capability derived 
from it with fewer rights, combined with the client's 
signature. 
With these structures for maintaining accounts, 
the Bank Server accepts commands to transfer 
amounts in one or mere currencies from one 
account o another, such as 
pay ( PrivAccnt: capability; ServSig: port; 
List: curlist); 
which is used to transfer an amount from a private 
account o a server account. PrivAccnt is a capa- 
bility for withdrawing from the private account. 
From the private account he Bank Server obtains 
the client's signature, which, together with the 
srver's signature, ServSig, identifies the server 
account and the client subaccount that the amount 
should go to. List is a list of one or more curren- 
cies and amounts to be transferred. Another com- 
mand is 
cash ( ServAccnt: capability; 
ClientSig, PrivSig: port; List: curlist); 
which is used by servers to collect the Virtual 
Money, earned by the excution of commands on 
behalf of a client. ServAccnt is a capability for the 
server account, ClientSig identifies the client that 
the command was executed for. The server obtains 
the client's signature fRom the signature field of 
received commands. PrivSig identifies the private 
account where the amounts pecified in List should 
be deposited. There are other commands, for 
example to transfer between private accounts, to 
create currencies, to examine accounts, etc. 
In commercial computer centres, clients can use 
as many resources as they please, as long as they 
pay for them. Virtual Money can be used to 
represent real money. The execution of each re- 
quest leads to the transfer of an amount repre- 
senting the price of the operation that was carried 
out. The mechanisms provided by the Bank Server 
make a finer grained accounting mechanism possi- 
ble. In most computer centres accounting and 
billing is only done by the centre itself, but our 
Bank Server allows the co-existence of many 
services, used by many different users, who are all 
paid separately for the services they offer. We can 
easily imagine, for instance, that a software house 
client of a computer centre writes a new compiler, 
offering it as a service, which, as it is used by other 
clients of that centre and the computer centre 
~tself, pays part of the software house's bills. 
In other types of computer centres, such as a 
university computer centre, Virtual Money can be 
used to represent the amount of resources a stu- 
dent may use up for a course; at the start of each 
course the system administrator t ansfers a certain 
amount of Virtual Money to each student who 
participates in the course. Different currencies can 
of course be used for different resources, effec- 
tively putting a quota on each resource. Re-alloc- 
able resources, such as disk blocks, can be given 
quotas by demanding payment for each allocated 
block, and giving a refund for each de-allocated 
block. The amount of Virtual Money given to each 
user then represents the maximum number of disk 
block he may use. 
10. Conclusions 
Many microcomputers and small office com- 
puters on the market today do not have built-in 
protection. Using off-the-shelf micros to build a 
ecure distributed operating system cannot be done 
using conventional operating systems, because 
these operating system exist at the mercy of pro- 
tection hardware. We have presented other ways 
to achieve security in computer networks. Our 
mechanisms do not prevent different processes 
within one computer from interfering with each 
other, but they give clients and servers a way to 
mutually authenticate ach other without any 
central authority. 
Our interprocess communication model pro- 
vides private communication channels between 
processes in one of the lower layers of the protocol 
hierarchy. This makes the design and implementa- 
tion of the higher levels (retransmission, flow con- 
trol, etc.) much simpler because there can be no 
interference from the outside. 
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Again, our model provides no protection against 
wire tapping; such protection can be achieved by 
using, for instance, end-to-end encryption on top 
of our protocol. The only threat we have tried to 
parry is the one that users will plug hosts with 
malicious operating systems into the network and 
try to use them to cheat the system's ecurity. This 
threat is real; most operating systems have security 
flaws, and even if the operating system is perfect, 
halting a personal computer and switching to 
another (or modified) operating system is easily 
done. 
One-way ciphers, or public key encryption form 
the basis of a secure communication mechanis, on 
top of which servers can implement services and 
objects, protected by the communication mecha- 
nism. The one-way cipher mechanism, and the 
public key mechanism can be built into existing 
operating systems with little effort. The one-way 
cipher scheme requires little or no special hard- 
ware, while the public-key encryption scheme can 
be used in any type of computer network. 
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